What are the Necessary Conditions for Successful Peacekeeping?
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Introduction

With the change in international relations after the Second World War, and the many movements towards decolonisation and independence, it became clear that not all international disputes were going to be resolved by peaceful means. Some way had to be found to stop or contain those which escalated into armed conflict. United Nations peacekeeping operations evolved out of that need.

Peacekeeping operations, however, were not originally envisaged in the United Nations Charter as among the measures to preserve world peace. The term 'peace-keeping operation' only gained currency in the 1960s, well after this concept had already been established in practice.

This essay will look at how peacekeeping operations have evolved, the factors that have affected their operation and the various recommendations that have been made in recent years to improve their effectiveness.

Definition of Peacekeeping

The *Blue Helmets: Review of UN Peace-keeping* (1990: 4-5) defines peace-keeping as:
> "...an operation involving military personnel but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict. These operations are voluntary and are based on consent and cooperation. While they involve the use of military personnel, they achieve their objectives not by force of arms, thus contrasting them with the 'enforcement action' of the United Nations under Article 42."

Such an operation falls broadly into two main categories: observer missions and peacekeeping forces, both operating under the same basic principles. They are normally established by the Security Council (or, exceptionally, authorised by the General Assembly), and they are directed by the Secretary-General. They have the consent of the host Governments and, normally, also of the other parties directly involved. The military personnel required are provided by Member States on a voluntary basis. (Blue Helmets**:** a review of UN peacekeeping, 1985**:** 3)

Observer Missions

Observer missions make up the majority of UN military operations. They are usually deployed in a benign environment (though not always, e.g. Sierra Leone) and consist of no more than few hundred, unarmed personnel. Hillen (1998: 22) says that UN military observers rarely had the military manpower to carry out their mandate effectively without the active cooperation of the parties involved and certainly had no power to coerce them into cooperation. If military observers were in danger from an aggressive environment, they were usually withdrawn or reduced significantly, as happened in Angola.

Traditional Peacekeeping Missions

Traditional peace-keeping missions (e.g.Cyprus) had more complex military tasks but still only consisted of no more than a few thousand lightly armed troops. Their objective was usually restricted to containing armed conflict in order to provide a stable atmosphere for the further political resolution of the conflict. They were authorised to use force only in self-defense or in defense of the mandate when under armed attack. Hillen (1998: 24) says that the light military capacity of traditional peacekeepers, however, usually prevented them from carrying out the latter, e.g. the general lack of resistance from UN troops in Lebanon during the periodic Israeli excursions across its border with Lebanon.

Second-Generation Peacekeeping Missions

With the end of the Cold War came greater agreement within the Security Council, resulting in an expanded number of responses to international crises. The new peacekeeping operations (e.g. Cambodia, Angola and Mozambique) were much larger in size, complexity and function than past peacekeeping operations. They had to operate in less supportive political environments, often in the middle of intrastate wars and often with no previously concluded peace settlement. This required larger and more aggressively equipped UN forces (Hillen, 1998: 25).

Hillen (1998: 26) says that these second-generation peace-keeping missions were qualitatively and quantitatively different from traditional missions which the UN had characterised as mere 'holding missions'. He notes that though sometimes still called peacekeeping, the concept of a true peacekeeping unit simply interposed between two dormant factions had envolved into an "untidy and intrusive host of soldiers and civilians who are supposed to demobilise guerrilla armies, run or monitor elections, train police forces and rebuild shattered infrastructures".

In other words, they had suddenly, in an ad hoc way, become extremely complicated affairs involving not only military personnel but civilian police officers, electoral experts and observers, deminers, human rights monitors, specialists in civil affairs and governance and experts in communications and public information. Their responsibilities ranged from protecting and delivering humanitarian assistance to helping former opponents carry out complicated peace agreements; assisting with the demobilisation of former fighters and their return to normal life to supervising and conducting elections; from training civilian police to monitoring respect for human rights and investigating alleged violations; and from coordinating the transition of a territory to autonomous status to setting up a transitional adminstration of a territory as it moved towards independence (United Nations Peacekeeping: 2003). They required not only attention to the mission's mandate but coordination within and a great deal of civil-military interface for which both the military and civilians were not fully prepared.

In addition to these, Goulding (1993: 188-119) adds a further three categories:

(1) *Preventive deployment* of United Nations troops before a conflict has actually begun, at the request of one of the parties and on its territory only. This was applied for the first time in Macedonia.

(2) *Deployment of a United Nations force in a country where the institutions of state have largely collapsed.* However, this is arguably not peacekeeping at all since it is likely to involve enforcement, peacemaking and post-conflict peacebuilding. Its most recent manifestation, in 2003, is the Solomon Islands international

force, sanctioned by the UN but led by Australia.

Consent

As already noted, peacekeeping missions must have the consent of host governments and the parties concerned. This is both an advantage in that it means the mission should be operating in a conducive environment but also a disadvantage in that the consent can be withdrawn, as happened in Egypt with UNEF 1.

For peacekeeping operations to succeed, there needs to be a great deal of local cooperation. This also depends on consent. Peacekeeping cannot succeed in the face of entrenched, widespread opposition. Nor would forced pacification necessarily provide a long term solution to a conflict. (UNITAR, 1996: 26)

Mandate

There is a general acceptance that peacekeeping missions should have a clear and realistic mandate. An unclear or ambiguous mandate means that the operation will face recurrent difficulties and become involved in actions likely to be viewed as controversial (The Blue Helmets: a review of UN peacekeeping, 1985: 4). Equally, giving a lightly armed peacekeeping force unrealistic objectives can undermine its credibility and eventually destroy the mission. Nevertheless, even with a clear mandate, no situation - particularly those involving conflict - are static. Mandates, and those responsible for them, must be flexible enough to change in order to deal with changing circumstances. One of the reasons for the success of the peacekeeping operations in Mozambique (see below) was this very willingness to change the mandate.

Use of force

Kuhne (2001: 379) says the use of force in peacekeeping operations needs clarification. The military still struggles with the question of how to use force without getting into a dangerous process of escalation and destroying the entire peace process. Politicians, journalists and the general public are equally confused. In Somalia, the confusion about the proper use of force led to tragic events and rushed withdrawal. Ultimately, the threat of or use of force should be limited to creating a safe environment for the implementation of the mandate and its mainly nonmilitary elements. These include the protection of UN and other personnel; protection of humanitarian aid transports and necessary infrastructure; the resettlement of refugees; deterrence of attacks on safe areas; and disarmament of combatants of the parties to the conflict. Kuhne (2001: 380) says the overriding purpose must always be to bring the warring parties back to the negotiating table and to contain the destructive, violent dynamics of conflict.

Permanent force

Another characteristic is the general improvisational nature of most peace-keeping operations. This affects availability and readiness which can have serious implications in terms of delays in deployment. There have been many eloquent pleas for a permanent UN peace force such as that of Joseph E. Schwartzberg (1997) for what he calls a UN Peace Corps. He claims that this would ensure a transition form the present ad hoc mode of peacekeeping to a more efficient and dependable system. Unfortunately, the present political, constitutional, administrative and budgetary arrangements of the United Nations are such that no permanent establishment can be maintained for peace-keeping (Blue Helmets: a review of UN peacekeeping, 1985: 4).

Peacekeeping and Peacemaking

Essentially, United Nations peacekeeping operations are provisional measures to prevent aggravation of a conflict situation. They can stop and contain hostilities but cannot resolve the political problems underlying the conflict. They can, and do, create the climate, buy the time, and promote the minimum goodwill necessary for settlement through negotiations or other peaceful means. Thus peacekeeping operations and peacemaking efforts are closely interrelated. The first promotes the second by creating conditions conducive to negotiations. The second helps the first since, when peacemaking efforts give hope for a peaceful solution of the conflict, the parties will be more inclined to observe a ceasefire and to cooperate with the peacekeeping operation (Blue Helmets: a review of UN peacekeeping, 1985: 7**).**

History of peacekeeping

The first peace-keeping operation established by the United Nations was an observer mission, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), set up in Palestine in June 1948 (and still in existence today). The first actual peacekeeping force was the First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF 1) which was in operation in the Egypt-Israel sector from November 1956 until May 1967. All told, to date, there have been 55 peacekeeping operations. Many have been longrunning with three, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), established in 1964, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) established in the Syrian Golan Heights in 1974; and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) established in 1978, all still in operation (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2003)

The first large scale, second-generation peacekeeping operation was the UN Transition Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). It was regarded by many as being successful but it was a rather qualified success. UNTAC's brief was to demobilise, disarm and canton 70 per cent of each party's military forces; create a neutral political environment that would allow the free and fair election of a constituent assembly; relaunch and rebuild Cambodia; repatriate and reintegrate the 350,000 refugees from the camps in Thailand; and protect the sovereignty and integrity of Cambodia. The programs were divided into seven components: Human Rights, Electoral, Military, Civil Administration, Police, Repatriation and Rehabilitation. It had a budget of US$3 billion. 5,000 Blue Helmets, 3,600 police and 5,000 officials were deployed from 32 countries. It was heavily financed by the international community, led by the Japanese, and was the biggest and most ambitious attempt by the United Nations to manage its activities in a country affected by war (Moore, 1996: 32).

However, UNTAC failed in a number of areas. It did not provide administrative control; the Blue Helmets were unable to gain access to areas controlled by the Khmer Rouge; and, crucially, the establishment of the rule of law and the demobilisation and disarmament of the factions were never achieved. Ceasefire violations continued in the central and north-west provinces and incidences of violence and intimidation occurred including attacks on Vietnamese-speaking persons. Moore (1996:3) says:

> "It (UNTAC) propped up the local economy, prepared for and supervised successful
> elections followed by the installation of a coalition government, spent a lot of money,
> and got out....it failed to to administer effectively the central ministries and it did not
> alleviate the disequilibrium between the centre and the provinces, where its reach was
> weak."

The elections were held at the appointed time - and without violence - but this was really UNTAC's only success in Cambodia. The atmosphere of uncertainty remained with fighting continuing in the provinces and human rights violations. Thus UNTAC only achieved a very small part of its task and left without securing the disarmament of the Khmer Rouge or achieving genuine political stability. It also left the country with no real recovery momentum in the countryside. This was a crucial factor given the absence of any capacity at the centre, the continuing unrest and outright miliary conflict (Moore, 1996: 33).

These effects are still being felt and the longer-term prospects for Cambodia are bleak. Harris (1999: 289) says that although there has been some improvement in material conditions, political freedoms have not. There is a lack of transparency within the government, little scope for genuine opposition in the National Assembly and laws are routinely passed without debate. Corruption is rife and banditry continues.

Change in peace-keeping demands
Today's peacekeeping operations largely occur in environments characterised by civil war or insurgency and frequently based on intractable national, religious, or ethnic differences (e.g. in Former Yugoslavia). They can involve numerous parties to a conflict; undisciplined factions who are not responsive to their own controlling authorities; an ineffective cease-fire; an absence of law and order; risk of local armed opposition to UN forces; the presence and involvement of large numbers of civilians, including refugees and displaced people; collapse of civil infrastructure; and an undefined area of operations. The grievances of parties to the conflict may have origins that are barely comprehensible to outsiders. There may be random atrocities and large-scale human suffering. Local governments may be uncooperative or rendered ineffective, and peacekeeping forces could face unexpected responsibilities in providing infrastructure facilities for the local populace, often in chaotic conditions. (UNITAR, 1996: 14).
Thus the range of tasks include: observation and monitoring; supervision of truces and cease-fires; demobilisation operations; conflict prevention; military assistance; humanitarian relief and its protection; establishment and supervision of protected areas; mine awareness and mine clearance operations; guarantee and denial of movements; and sanctions. Peacekeeping operations do not as a rule, however, involve conflict containment or sanctions. (UNITAR, 1996: 15)

Peace-keeping has clearly become complicated. There are overlaps with peace enforcement, peace building**,** the establishment of law and order, and such 'civilian' concerns as the reintegration of ex-combatants and the economic restoration of communities.

What constitutes a successful Peacekeeping Operation?
In the long term, peacekeeping operations require resolution by conciliation rather than termination by force. They need to be viewed as the complement to diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian endeavours that converge to enact political objectives.   They need to be measured not only by the rate at which they progress toward the achievement of the UN mandate but how successfully they achieve the transition into peacebuilding and the subsequent level of its success**.**

There is a simplistic view that peacekeeping operations need simply help bring about a fair settlement to a conflict. The concepts of victory or defeat, which are military terms, however, are inappropriate to peacekeeping operations. The subordination of military operations to political and diplomatic activity

may result in shifts in military objectives, and, depending on the state of affairs at any given point in the operation, such shifts may create difficulties and frustrations for military personnel. Military commanders will therefore need to issue clear orders and instructions to their troops to ensure that their efforts match such shifting objectives. In any event, the activities and methods used by the UN force is always completely and absolutely constrained by the scope of its mandate, its resources and the demands of international law (UNITAR, 1996: 17).

Peacekeeping operations, however, are greater than the sum of their parts. Their goal is not to simply keep warring factions from fighting each other so that political and diplomatic activities can proceed but to create an environment where the peace will be long lasting. This may not be spelled out in their mandate but is inherent in their military tasks, particularly in how conflict is prevented, in demobilisation operations which must be connected to the difficult task of reintegration, in restoring law and justice and in the ultimate transition to restoring the economy. These are the ultimate tests of the success of peacekeeping operations.

The UN and the great powers

It is ironic, given the role that Britain played in the recent war on Iraq, that a paper given at a British Labour Party conference in 1969 said:

> "The problem of the great powers and their reaction to the majority rule of the small powers which does not always accord with their policies may cause grave dangers. Czechoslovakia and Vietnam are evidence that neither of the largest powers is willing as yet to allow the UN to solve all dispute; they have continued to exercise their military might outside the sphere of the UN. Although incapable of wielding the same force to settle issues as the major powers, there is the tendency on the part of almost all members to reject UN interference in areas they consider to be of vital interest to themselves."

Until this attitude changes, the UN will never have the moral strength it needs to be able to stand up to whatever "great" power is asserting itself at the time or have the sources it needs to carry out successful peace support operations - though the United States' current difficulties in handling the reconstruction of Iraq may be going someway to restoring the status of the UN.

Success, failure - or things outside UN control?

Osman (2002: 35) cites Afghanistan as having been a successful operation. Yet, changes in world politics and particularly the declaration of new Soviet foreign policies by Mikhail Gorbachev played a crucial role in the bringing about of some peaceful settlements. In Afghanistan, it was the willingness of the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces that enabled the process of peaceful settlement. The UN provided useful supervision and support for the peaceful negotiations initiated by the United States and the Soviet Union but it was the agreement between the two superpowers in the Security Council that enhanced the Council's ability to act.

Not that this was of much help to Afghanistan in the long run. Civil war continued, the repressive Taliban eventually took control of most of the country and 4.6 million refugees fled the country. UN involvement through its humanitarian efforts after the Russians withdrew did not bring peace to the country. By 1999, following the Taliban's refusal to stop providing sanctuary and training to terrorist groups, the UN had applied broad sanctions under the the enforcement provisions of the Charter. Following 11 September 2001, with US involvement, the Taliban were defeated and the Afghan Interim Administration was established. In

December, 2001, the Security Council established the Interim Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to help the Authority maintain security in Kabul and its surrounding areas. Despite all this, the country outside Kabul remains in a lawless state with the warlords still in charge, little has changed for women and there is a very long way to go before the administration is functioning properly.

The UN clearly tries to do its best. But the job of restoring just one country, Afghanistan, to normality after 23 years of war, is enormous. To try and restore all the countries of the world who have undergone conflict defies imagination and can only be done with the support of all the Member States and the provision of adequate funding and resources.

Jett (2000) provides an account of the experience of two peacekeeping operations with quite different outcomes - the failure of the United Nations Verification Mission II in Angola (UNAVEM II) and the relative success of the United Nations Mission in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). Jett (2000: 7) says that despite the two countries similar histories (both former Portuguese colonies with anticolonial independence movements), the outcome of their respective peacekeeping operations was very different. Mozambique achieved peace while Angola remained at war.

The conflict in Angola continued on and off from the time the country obtained its independence from Portugal in 1975. By 1999, there had been over 800,000 deaths. Both the government and the rebels, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) headed by Jonas Savimbi, had given up any pretense of dialogue by mid-1998. UNAVEM II was charged with verifying that three things were being accomplished: military demobilisation, police neutrality and the holding of fair elections. Despite UN efforts, the parties failed to achieve the first two. The elections did go ahead but with an equivocal outcome. The situation grew steadily more difficult and dangerous for the peacekeepers with the government's propaganda efforts against UNITA increasingly including hostility towards the UN. By the time UNAVEM II's mandate expired, the country was already at war again.

In Mozambique, in addition to the same three objectives in Angola, ONUMOZ had to supervise the ceasefire between the two parties, coordinate and monitor humanitarian assistance throughout the country, provide security for key transportation corridors, assist the reintegration of the demobilised soldiers, and oversee the formation of a single, unified army. While it was not an unqualified success, ONUMOZ was able to accomplish the key elements of its mission (Jett, 2000: 76).

Jett (2000: 77) says that two of the main differences between UNAVEM II and ONUMOZ was that ONUMOZ had a strong mandate and ample resources. Importantly, though, the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SPSG), Aldo Ajello, was also willing to use both of them in a very flexible and, when necessary, aggressive manner. Moreover, he maintained a good level of cooperation with all the parties involved, including the government. One Security Council assessment of ONUMOZ noted that "The local actors have too much historic and political baggage to overcome their mutual mistrust and implement faithfully agreements they have signed. They need to be constantly prodded and not be allowed to claim national sovereignty as a reason for delay or failure to implement". Jett (2000: 79) says it was just such prodding by Ajello that eventually ensured that both sides lived up to their obligations.

Jett (2000: 79) contrasts this with the style of the head of UNAVEM II in Angola. He says the SRSG in Angola, Margaret Anstee, had nowhere near the mandate or the resources that Ajello had. Anstee claimed,

apparently, that there had never been the international resolve to achieve a solution to the conflict in Angola. Nevertheless she made it clear that it was the lack of internal, not international, resolve that led to the failure to find peace. For a start, the Angolan government and UNITA intentionally limited the UN role when they negotiated the peace accord and then failed to fulfill their obligations to implement what they had signed. Jett (2000: 80) says that where Ajello was able to manipulate the parties, Anstee gives the impression of having been more of a spectator and allowed herself to be pushed around, not only by the conflicting parties, but by the UN, donors and the media. Where Ajello was not only unafraid to exceed his mandate, but effectively re-wrote it on a regular basis, Anstee rarely exceeded hers and even then in less than daring ways.

Jett (2000: 82) says that she also erred in her treatment of Savimbi, regarding him as a reasonable man who acted in good faith whereas he was a man who operated by force and responded only to force. (In fact the fighting in Angola really only ended, not for any diplomatic or political reasons, but when Savimbi was assassinated in 2002.)

It might be unfair to say that much of the responsibility for the failure in Angola rested on Anstee's shoulders while the success in Mozambique was due to Ajello's greater willingness to change the mandate. Nevertheless, there is a lot to be said for the having the right person in the job.

The other factor that kept the war going in Angola was the availability of natural resources, in particular oil and diamonds. The warring parties were able to use much of this wealth to sustain their militaries. Between 1984 and 1994, Angola imported just under $11 billion in arms. Mozambique was not so "blessed". (Jett, 2000: 124). There are thus forces external to the peacekeeping operations over which the UN can have little control. A great deal depends on the will of the parties involved to _want_ peace.
Another operation that can be considered successful but is an example of how long term such operations can be is the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). UNFICYP was set up in 1964 to prevent further fighting between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. Despite much violence occurring in 1967 which rendered the peacekeeping efforts ineffective for several years after, the force functioned with much success in accordance with the terms of its mandate and helped to re-establish reasonably tolerable conditions in the island (Jones, 1979: 151).

In 1974, however, the situation changed dramatically following a coup against President Makarios which resulted in the Turkish invasion of the island. Jones (1979: 151) says that if it had not been for the collapse of the Colonels' regime in Greece, it is probable that there would have been war between Greece and Turkey. This exposed the fragile nature of the UN peace-keeping operation in Cyprus. Following the 1974 hostilities, the Mission's responsibilities were expanded and UNFICYP remains on the island to this day to supervise ceasefire lines, maintain a buffer zone and undertake humanitarian activities. After all these years it is still only a ceasefire. No settlement has been reached.

If someone wants to go to war, however, they will and at times the UN has no choice but to simply withdraw. The United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), for example, was established in 1991 following forced withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Its task was to monitor the demilitarised zone along the Iraq-Kuwait border, deter border violations and report on any hostile action. On 17 March

2003, in advance of the military campaign against Iraq by the coalition led by the US, UNIKOM was withdrawn from its area of operation and its mandate suspended. The Secretary-General reported that most of the mission's property and premises on the Iraqi side of the demilitarised zone were totally destroyed or stolen during or soon after the most recent conflict and that the mission headquarters at Um Qasr was largely demolished by looting before or during the hostilities. On 3 July, 2003 the Security Council voted unanimously to phase out it out by 6 October (UN News Centre, 7 Oct, 2003).

Changes needed
Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (The Brahimi Report)
In 2000, at the Secretary-General's behest, *"The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations***",** commonly known as *"The Brahimi Report"* after the Chairman of the Panel, Lakhdar Brahimi, was produced which made wide-ranging recommendations on improvements to peace operations. One of its most important observations was that "peacekeepers and peacebuilders are inseparable partners since only a self-sustaining peace offers a ready exit to peacekeeping forces". The reports most significant recommendations concerned:

Doctrine and strategy: The need for more effective conflict prevention strategies since prevention is far preferable for those concerned and less costly for the international community than military action, humanitarian relief or reconstruction after a war. The UN Secretariat should draw up a plan for developing better peacebuilding strategies.
Mandates: The Secretariat must tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear, when formulating or changing mission mandates. Peacekeepers must be able to defend themselves and their mandate with "robust rules of engagement" agtainst those who renege on commitments or seek to undermine peace accords by violence.
Transitional civil adminstration: The idea of an international criminal code should be explored, for use in places where the United Nmations is given temporary executive power (as in Kosovo or East Timor), pending the establishment of local rule of law and law enforcement capacity.
Personnel: The Panel did <u>not</u> call for a standing United Nations army but recommended that Member States should work together to form a multinational, brigade-sized force and a pool of civilian police offices, ready for effective deployment within prescribed timelines (Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations: Summary of Recommendations, 2000: pp1-6)

A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change
In 2002, a multi-donor study was carried out by the International Peace Institute, *A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change"* which undertook in-depth analyses of key peace operations that have been under way since the publication of the Brahimi Report and makes a range of recommendations regarding the relevance, preparedness, effectiveness and efficiency of UN activities. Many of the reports' findings are the same as those noted in the Brahimi report, e.g. the need for strengthening strategic planning processes, greater flexibility and clear and realistic mandates. It also noted the need for strong mission leadership and to resolve the relationship between peacekeeping and humanitarian delivery**.** It also stressed the need for a viable exit strategy with the emphasis on leaving a sustainable legacy and on ensuring that structures

are in place that allow for a continuation of what the mission began, including development activities. It also emphasised the overriding need to develop a clear, robust and practicable strategy for establishing and operationalising rule-of-law institutions (A Review of Peace Operations: Summary of Recommendations, 2000: pp 1-10)

Gender implications

It is an interesting (though not surprising) phenomenon that none of the reviews or reports on peacekeeping mention the role or participation of women. Few of the Security Council Resolutions establishing mandates of peacekeeping missions, or the mandates themselves, include a commitment to gender equality. When women's issues are mentioned, as in the Security Council resolution on East Timor, it is usually only as an expression of concern about the *impact* of violence on women and children not about the role they may play in peacekeeping or peacebuilding (Women, Peace and Security, 2002: 74).

Nevertheless, for the past 12 years or so, complex peacekeeping operations have involved many civilians and many women as part of the mission. Mazurana (2002: 43) found that those peacekeeping operations with more civilians and less militaries have tended to have more women personnel *and also to have been more successful*. By 'succcessful' she means the ability of the operation to meet its mandate, contribute to peaceful resolutions of external disputes, promote rights education, provide assistance in enabling civil society to develop, and the local community reconstruct their lives.

The expanded and complex nature of modern peacekeeping missions has increased the appropriateness of increased women's participation in UN missions; it has also increased the likelihood of the mission having a direct impact on women and men of the host country. This has increased the need for mission attentiveness to gender issues and gender balance. In addition, gender mainstreaming can simply increase the understanding of a complex situation and increase the pool of talent available to deal with it. (Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Operations: 2000: 3).

The most significant event highlighting the impact of armed conflict on women and role of women as peacebuilders, was the adoption on 31 October 2000 of Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. On 24 and 25 October, 2000 the Security Council held an open session on women, peace and security in which 40 Member States made statements supporting the mainstreaming of gender perspectives into peace support operations and the participation of women in all aspects of peace processes, including peacekeeping operations. (Women, Peace and Security, 2002: 1).

The report *Women, Peace and Security* recommended in the Resolution and carried out in 2002 makes the point that peacekeeping operations have a profound impact on people's lives. The mandate of a mission should include a commitment to promoting gender equality from the mission's inception until its end. There should be explicit support from the highest level of authority within the mission; all professional staff should be trained to be able to identify and address gender perspectives in their areas of work; and attention to gender perspectives need to be incorporated into all standard operating procedures, manuals, instructions and other instruments which guide the work of peacekeeping missions (Women, Peace and Security, 2002: 73-79). Promoting gender equality in all aspects of peacekeeping missions is a vital element in their success.

Conclusion

There is a fundamental difference between sending soldiers off to fight a war and sending them to keep the peace. A whole different attitude is required. There is an extract from a speech by General Douglas MacArthur often quoted by the US army:

> "Your mission remains fixed, determined, inviolable. It is to win our wars. All other public purposes will find others for their accomplishment. Yours is the profession of arms. The will to win. The sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory, that the very obsession of your public service must be duty, honour, country."

Professional soldiers are trained to win battles in defence of their country, to take the offensive when necessary and to be willing to kill or be killed when necessary. These are clear cut objectives requiring nothing more than good military strategies and tactics and troops who are well trained in them. Peacekeeping is much more complicated. There are seldom battles to be fought and if there are, it is not always clear whether the peacekeepers should be fighting them. Ordinary soldiers are suddenly required to be diplomats, negotiators, mediators, social workers, humanitarian specialists, everything but what they were originally trained for. **(**Schoups, 2001: 393**)**

The objective is not to kill or be killed but to ensure that there is **no** killing at all. Furthermore, it is to ensure that there will be no killing the future either and that the country or countries concerned are returned to a state where the rule of law prevails and civil administration functions properly. Is peacekeeping the answer? Has the world not advanced enough to not need the ultimate threat of force - even the limited force of a peacekeeping operation?

Despite the best efforts of the UN, in many areas of the world violence, even genocide, have prevailed. The UN has had some unmitigated disasters such as Rwanda where it virtually failed to do anything. It has had experiences such as Bosnia or Somalia where it tried but failed and in the eyes of the world appeared to be completely impotent. It has had such complications as NATOs involvement in Kosovo. These have all shaken the world's confidence in the United Nations and its peacekeeping abilities. The determination of the US to make the war on Iraq in 2003 without Security Council approval added to the air of vulnerability. However, peacekeeping operations are not isolated military operations. They are inextricably linked to long-term peacebuilding. The US is finding this out in Iraq.

Peacekeeping operations do not happen in isolation. Ultimately, even if all practical measures are attended to such as clear mandates, leadership and good management, adequate finances and resources, proper logistical support, and re-establishing the rule of law, this will not ensure the success of peacekeeping operations. Their success can really only be measured within the context of the peace processes that precede them and the peacebuilding that follows them. Above all, the parties concerned must *want* peace and the international community must have the interest and resolve to collectively help them to achieve it.

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